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Abstract
Direct realists about episodic memory claim that a rememberer has direct contact with a past event. How-
ever, how is it possible to be acquainted with an event that ceased to exist? That is the so-called cotemporal-
ity problem. The standard solution, proposed by Sven Bernecker, is to distinguish between the occurrence 
of an event and the existence of an event: an event ceases to occur without ceasing to exist. That is the 
eternalist solution for the cotemporality problem. Nevertheless, some philosophers of memory claim that 
the adoption of an eternalist metaphysics of time would be too high a metaphysical price to pay to hold 
direct realist intuitions about memory. Although I agree with these critics, I will make two claims. First, 
that this kind of common sense argument is far from decisive. Second, that Bernecker’s proposal remains 
the best solution to the cotemporality problem.
César Schirmer dos Santos 
Federal University of Santa Maria (Universidade Federal de Santa Maria)
Essays Philos (2018)19:2  |  DOI:  10.7710/1526-0569.1613
Correspondence:  cesar.santos@ufsm.br
Essays in Philosophy
Volume 19, Issue 2Essays in Philosophy
2 | eP1613 Essays in Philosophy
Introduction
This paper concerns the so-called cotemporality problem about the intentional object of 
an episodic memory.1 In short, this problem involves a conflict between the idea that 
memory is about the past and the idea that the past does not exist. We will see that the 
main solution to this problem is to adopt an eternalist metaphysics of time. Neverthe-
less, some critics see eternalism as a theory too far from common sense to be accepted 
as a solution. Regarding this question, I will argue that yes, there could be resistance, on 
the part of regular people, to eternalism. However, I will add that the main problem for 
common people is not eternalism itself, but the sophisticated style of reasoning of any 
complex theory—including alternatives to eternalism as a solution to the cotemporality 
problem. 
I will proceed as follows. In section 1, I explain why the cotemporality problem affects 
episodic memory without affecting other kinds of memory. Section 2 presents the co-
temporality problem as a question related to the classical dispute between direct and 
indirect (representative) realists. In section 3, I briefly discuss the position according to 
which all varieties of episodic hypothetical thought have the same kind of intentional 
object. In section 4, I answer some questions related to the eternalist solution to the co-
temporality problem. Section 5 explores statements by David Hume and Thomas Reid to 
illustrate that direct and indirect realists, regarding the intentional object of an episodic 
memory, could claim proximity with some commonsensical ideas, and that it does not 
mean that one or other of these two theories is clearly commonsensical. Section 6 is 
about the intrinsically superficial nature of common sense. I will claim that common 
sense is characterized by practicality and absence of method. Section 7 explains how 
eternalism can be a solution to the cotemporality problem. 
1. Kinds of Memory
This paper is about the intentional object of an episodic memory. There are many types 
of memory, both cognitive and noncognitive.2 Our question concerns the two cogni-
tive varieties of memory: episodic and semantic. Since semantic memory concerns facts 
learned in the personal past, and facts can be assessed as true or false, the question about 
the intentional object of a semantic memory is relatively simple to answer: a semantic 
memory of p is about the (true) fact that p. However, the question about the intentional 
object of an episodic memory is more complex. Episodic memories “often involve ex-
1  Sven Bernecker, The Metaphysics of Memory (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 68–71.
2  Kourken Michaelian, Mental Time Travel: Episodic Memory and Our Knowledge of the Personal Past 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016), 30.
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quisite detail, as well as perspective, imagery, and emotion.”3 That being the case, the 
intentional object of an episodic memory is not—at least not in a simple or direct way—a 
fact expressed by a proposition: 
The nature of the representations involved in individual episodic memory and 
episodic future thought is a complex question, but it is fairly clear that these are 
not (or not wholly) propositional. . . . Propositions can accommodate neither 
sensory detail nor temporal structure.4  
If the intentional object of an episodic memory is not purely propositional, then what 
is it? The best candidate among the main varieties of beings—individuals (objects and 
events), properties and facts—is an event. But, which kind of event? There are at least 
two good candidates for intentional objects of an episodic memory: (1) the past and ob-
jective event that originated the subjective sensory details experienced in the present and 
(2) the present and subjective event of the experience of sensory detail, perspective, im-
agery, and emotion.5 A direct realist about the intentional object of an episodic memory 
holds that the past event is the intentional object of an episodic memory and partially 
constitutes the content of an episodic memory.6 An indirect or representative realist about 
the intentional object of an episodic memory claims that the intentional object of an 
episodic memory is a present representation of a past event. 
In sum, keeping in mind that the intentional object of an episodic memory is an event 
(instead of an object, property, or fact), the cotemporality problem can be reissued as a 
dispute about the nature of the event that is the intentional object of an episodic memory. 
There are two main philosophical positions about the intentional object of an episodic 
memory: direct realism, which holds that the intentional object of an episodic memory is 
a past external event, and representative realism, which holds that the intentional object 
of an episodic memory is a present internal event.
3  Sarah K. Robins, “Memory Traces,” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory, ed. Sven 
Bernecker and Kourken Michaelian (London: Routledge, 2017), 77.
4  Kourken Michaelian and John Sutton, “Collective Mental Time Travel: Remembering the Past and 
Imagining the Future Together,” Synthese (2017), https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1449-1.
5  Jordi Fernández, “The Intentional Objects of Memory,” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of 
Memory, edited by Sven Bernecker and Kourken Michaelian (London: Routledge, 2017), 89.
6  Dorothea Debus, “Experiencing the Past: A Relational Account of Recollective Memory,” Dialectica, 
62, no. 4 (2008): 405–32, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2008.01165.x.
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2. Two Kinds of Realism 
Representative realists about memory claim that the intentional object of an episod-
ic memory is an internal representation that occurs simultaneously to the situation of 
memory retrieval. According to this variety of realism, when agent S recollects event E, 
the intentional object of the recollection is a present representation of E instead of the past 
event E itself. If we make use of the distinction between the vehicle and the intentional 
object of a representation, representative realism about episodic memory means that the 
vehicle and the intentional object of the recollection are both present instead of past, 
which means that, according to representative realism, what is remembered is not the 
past event E, but the present representation of E. 
Direct realists about episodic memory view representative realism as an unbearable 
theory. They claim that if the objects of our memories are present representations, then 
memory gives us no direct contact with the past. Also, if memory is about the present, 
then memory can never be accurate. A memory of event E has to be about E—which 
means, to a direct realist philosopher, that E itself constitutes, at least partially, the con-
tent of the memory.7 The vehicle of the representation of the past can be present, but the 
intentional object of an episodic memory has to be past. The problem with representa-
tive realism is that it deprives us of any mnemic contact with the past itself. The direct 
realist does not accept that. Because of their uneasiness with representative realism, di-
rect realist philosophers claim that an agent S has direct contact with the past itself when 
he or she remembers event E:
The main question at issue is evidently whether these images are really judged to be 
contemporaneous with the process of apprehending them. If not, they should not 
be presumed to exist in the present, and the principle of parsimony, if nothing else, 
would lead us to expect that they are simply the past events themselves. That they are 
apprehended in the present is beyond question, but it does not follow on that account 
that they are present existences. . . . The plain man, it is true, is apt to be puzzled when 
he is asked where his memory-images exist, and when they exist. . . . But the plain man 
does not confuse his images with his percepts, and it would be a very gross confusion 
indeed if he localised his images within the space which he perceives at the time of 
imaging. Indeed, if he did so he would suffer from hallucination. . . . In other words, 
any one who has an explicit memory-image literally transports himself in memory to 
the time and place of his original experience.8 
7  John Campbell, Reference and Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
8  J. Laird, “Recollection, Association and Memory,” Mind 26, no. 104 (1917): 411–12.
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When S recollects E, S is literally in direct contact, in the present, with the past event E. 
The problem is that it is not obvious how anyone can have direct contact, in the present, 
with an event that has already ceased to exist. That is the so-called cotemporality problem.9
How is it possible for an agent to be in direct contact, in the present, with an event that 
has ceased to exist? The main solution, as we will see, is to claim that the past event ex-
ists—even though it is not occurring now.10 The question about the existence of past 
events is a topic in the metaphysics of time. There are two main theories about the ex-
istence of events. On the one hand, presentist philosophers claim that all there is are 
presently existing objects, properties, and states of affairs, including events. On the other 
hand, eternalist philosophers claim that present, past, and future objects, properties, and 
states of affairs are equally real at any time: “A piece of past existence is just that piece of 
past existence for all time. Because it is past it is eternally safe.”11 The past event E, for 
instance, is real now, which means that, granted eternalism about the nature of time, 
nonoccurrence in the present of the event E is no obstacle for S’s direct contact with E. 
Having in mind these two theories of time, we can see that direct realism about episod-
ic memory seems problematic just because we tacitly presuppose presentism, the view 
about the reality of time according to which only presently existing events are real. The 
solution is straightforward. A direct realist about episodic memory has to be an eternal-
ist about time.12 Let’s call this proposal the eternalist solution. 
Not all philosophers of memory sympathetic to direct realism are happy with the eter-
nalist solution. Kourken Michaelian and John Sutton, for instance, claim that eternalism 
may be an “expensive” solution: 
The cotemporality problem arises because, while direct realism claims that the 
direct object of a present memory is a past event, there is no obvious sense in 
which a subject now might be directly related to a past event. Bernecker argues 
that the cotemporality problem can be avoided if we assume that past events 
continue to exist even after they have occurred. This may, however, be a high 
metaphysical price to pay simply in order to respect direct realist intuitions.13 
9  Bernecker, Metaphysics of Memory, 71
10  Ibid., 68.
11  Laird, “Recollection, Association and Memory,” 410.
12  Bernecker, Metaphysics of Memory, 71.
13  Kourken Michaelian and John Sutton. “Memory,” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 
2017 edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/memory/.
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In this passage concerning direct realism about the intentional object of an episodic 
memory and Bernecker’s solution to the cotemporality problem, Michaelian and Sut-
ton are claiming two things. First, that the meaning of the notion of a direct relation 
between a rememberer and a past event is not obvious. Second, that, for this reason, the 
proposal of a direct contact with the past needs heavy theoretical argumentation. I agree 
with these claims. Even if regular people may eventually be able to claim direct contact 
with past events through memory, what a direct contact with the past means remains 
obscure. The possibility of this kind of relation with the past can be explained by eternal-
ism. However, eternalism is far from obvious.
Let’s take stock. In section 1, we saw that there are various kinds of memory, but the co-
temporality problem concerns just episodic memory. In this section, we saw that there 
are two main varieties of classical realism about the intentional object of an episodic 
memory: direct realism and representative realism. In the next sections, we will proceed 
as follows. In section 4, we will examine some questions related to eternalism. In section 
5, we will explore the classical debate between direct and indirect realists. In section 6, 
we will discuss some features of common sense that are relevant for the assessment of 
Bernecker’s solution to the cotemporality problem. In section 7, we will examine some 
direct realist replies to indirect realist objection. But before that, we will see, in the next 
section, how André Sant’Anna and Kourken Michaelian propose that we rebuild the 
framework for the debate about the intentional object of an episodic memory.
3. Episodic Hypothetical Thought
 In a recent article, Sant’Anna and Michaelian reissue the classical debate over the in-
tentional objects of episodic memory in the context of the contemporary debate about 
episodic hypothetical thought and mental time travel.14 A detailed analysis of Sant’Anna 
and Michaelian’s proposal is beyond the scope of the present paper. Nonetheless, I would 
like to—coarsely—situate Sant’Anna and Michaelian’s position in the context of the dis-
cussion about the intentional object of an episodic memory, the cotemporality problem, 
and common sense. I will not describe the complex details of the pragmatist solution 
proposed by Sant’Anna and Michaelian because this subject is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
Sant’Anna and Michaelian see episodic memory as a form of episodic hypothetical 
14  André Sant’Anna and Kourken Michaelian, “Thinking about Events: A Pragmatist Account of the 
Objects of Episodic Hypothetical Thought,” Review of Philosophy and Psychology (January 2018), https://
www.researchgate.net/publication/323184598.
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thought (or mental time travel). Episodic hypothetical thought is a genus with four spe-
cies: episodic memory, episodic future thought, past-oriented counterfactual thought, 
and future-oriented counterfactual thought. The varieties of episodic hypothetical 
thought are distinguished by temporal reference and modal status. There is episodic 
memory when S believes that an episodic thought is about the past in the actual world. 
There is episodic future thought when S believes that an episodic thought is about the 
future in the actual world. There is past-oriented counterfactual thought when S believes 
that an episodic thought is about the past in some possible world different from the ac-
tual world. Finally, there is future-oriented counterfactual thought when S believes that 
an episodic thought is about the future in some possible world different from the actual 
world. Episodic memory can be distinguished from misremembering and confabulation 
because remembering allows only true inferences about past events, misremembering 
allows some true and some false inferences about past events, and confabulation allows 
only false inferences about past events. 
Sant’Anna and Michaelian claim that the classical framework of the debate about the in-
tentional objects of episodic memories is inappropriate to the debate over the intentional 
objects of episodic thoughts in general. The problem is twofold. On the one hand, direct 
realism is a variety of “relationism”: if S is not (causally) related to E, then S is not re-
membering E. The problem is that there is no suitable causal relationship between S and 
future or counterfactual events. On the other hand, an indirect realist philosopher claims 
that if S represents E properly, then S remembers E. The problem is that representations 
are “silent,” in the sense that “they do not establish their own satisfaction conditions.”15 
Therefore, the classical space of inquiry about the intentional objects of episodic memo-
ries has to be replaced by a new framework where the question about the intentional 
objects of episodic hypothetical thoughts in general could be investigated properly. 
Regarding the question about the intentional objects of episodic hypothetical thoughts 
in general, Sant’Anna and Michaelian endorse continuism: the thesis that all varieties of 
episodic hypothetical thought have the same kind of intentional object. Dorothea Debus 
and Denis Perrin, on the other hand, hold discontinuism: the thesis that the kind of the 
intentional object of an episodic memory is different from the kind (or kinds) of the 
intentional objects of episodic future thoughts, episodic counterfactual thoughts and 
episodic counterfactual thoughts.16 Sant’Anna and Michaelian present no argument for 
15  Ibid.
16  Dorothea Debus, “Mental Time Travel: Remembering the Past, Imagining the Future, and the 
Particularity of Events,” Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5, no. 3 (2014): 333–50, https://doi.
org/10.1007/s13164-014-0182-7; Denis Perrin, “Asymmetries in Subjective Time,” in Seeing the Future: 
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continuism. They just take it for granted: 
In psychology . . . it is increasingly taken for granted that episodic memory 
can be adequately understood only if it is seen as one instance among others 
of a more general capacity for simulating possible episodes. On this view, 
episodic memory overlaps heavily with other forms of episodic hypothetical 
thought—also known as “mental time travel”—at every level from the neural 
to the phenomenological. . . . We will simply take for granted the consensus 
view that the more general category of episodic hypothetical thought is prior 
to the more specific category of episodic memory. This view suggests that the 
traditional question of the objects of episodic memory should be replaced with 
a new question: What are the direct objects of episodic hypothetical thought?17 
Although the current view in psychology can be taken to suggest that the classical frame-
work for the debate about the intentional object of an episodic memory has to be re-
placed by a continuist framework, which would be advantageous for the discussion of 
the nature of the intentional objects of episodic hypothetical thoughts in general, it does 
not seem that this suggestion is a sufficient reason to argue against discontinuism. Still, 
Sant’Anna and Michaelian only present, as such an argument, the fact that it “makes 
what intuitively seems to be a unified mental phenomenon into something fundamen-
tally disunified.”18 The problem is that this reason begs the question of what debunks 
discontinuism—to be a discontinuist is exactly to claim that what seems to be a unified 
mental phenomenon is something fundamentally disunified. 
The scope of this paper does not allow me to dig deeper into Sant’Anna and Michaelian’s 
article. But I suggest that they are right in advocating for a unified kind of intentional ob-
ject for all varieties of episodic hypothetical thought. Nonetheless, a mere suggestion based 
on the practices of an important group of researchers is not sufficient to discount entirely 
a view such as discontinuism. Substantive reasons are required. Keeping this in mind, I 
will return to the question about the relationship between intentional objects of episodic 
memories, the cotemporality problem, and common sense in the classical framework. 
Sant’Anna and Michaelian claim two things about Bernecker’s solution to the cotempo-
rality problem. First, that eternalism is not intuitive: 
Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel, edited by Kourken Michaelian, Stanley 
B. Klein, and Karl K. Szpunar (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 39–61.
17  Sant’Anna and Michaelian, “Thinking about Events.”
18  Ibid.
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Eternalism is an intuitively implausible view. Some may already be convinced 
of eternalism for independent reasons. To them, the eternalist solution to the 
cotemporality problem comes at no extra metaphysical cost. Others, of course, 
are not so convinced. To some of these, the price of the solution may seem to 
be too high.19
Second, they claim that Bernecker’s solution requires the classical framework for the de-
bate over the intentional objects of episodic memories. However, the classical framework 
has ceased to be satisfactory. Therefore, a new solution is required. 
I agree with Sant’Anna and Michaelian’s claim that eternalism can be an acceptable (but 
“intuitively implausible”) solution for the problem of the intentional object of an episod-
ic memory without being an acceptable solution for the problem of the intentional object 
of episodic mental states in general. However, I believe that discontinuism is plausible 
and that, therefore, there are no substantive reasons to abdicate the classical framework. 
Discontinuism is plausible because we can explain the contact between subject and the 
intentional object of episodic memory in a way that is not available for the explanation 
of the contact between subject and the intentional objects of future or counterfactual 
episodic thoughts. Having this fact in mind, in the following sections I will return to the 
discussion of the cotemporality problem in the classical framework for the debate about 
the intentional object of an episodic memory.  
4. Two Problems
In the classical framework for the debate over the intentional objects of episodic memo-
ries, the main problems with the eternalist solution for the cotemporality problem, ac-
cording to Sant’Anna and Michaelian, are (1) that there is nothing obvious in the idea 
that a rememberer is in direct contact with a past event and (2) that eternalism is not 
intuitive. That is why the eternalist solution would be problematic. It makes it meta-
physically expensive to hold the main intuition behind direct realism. Let’s call these 
problems The Problem of the Direct Contact with a Past Event (PDCPE) and The Problem 
of the Intuitive Implausibility of Eternalism (PIIE). 
 • The Problem of the Direct Contact with a Past Event (PDCPE): It is not obvious 
that a rememberer is in direct contact with a past event. 
 • The Problem of the Intuitive Implausibility of Eternalism (PIIE): Eternalism is 
intuitively implausible as a view about the nature of time. 
19  Ibid.
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On (PDCPE), I think there is some truth in the claim that the idea of a direct contact 
between a rememberer and a past event is “no[t] obvious,” as Michaelian and Sutton 
claim.20 However, I think that the situation is more complex because later in the same ar-
ticle, the same authors claim that “direct realism . . . claims that . . . when one remembers, 
one is in the first instance related to past events themselves; it is thus perhaps the most 
intuitively appealing view of the nature of the objects of memory.”21 
As I see it, it is fair to interpret this passage as saying that the view of a rememberer as 
being in direct contact with a past event is highly intuitive. It seems fair to interpret a 
“first instance” relation between a rememberer and a past event as direct contact be-
tween rememberer and past event. What would not be charitable would be to attribute 
to Michaelian and Sutton, without a justification, a contradiction. Since Michaelian and 
Sutton claim that the idea of a direct contact between a rememberer and a past event is 
both “no[t] obvious” and “the most intuitively appealing view,” they seem to contradict 
themselves. But, are they really contradicting themselves? That is not my opinion. I think 
that, as a matter of fact, common sense goes both ways. On the one hand, there is a com-
monsensical train of thought that makes us conclude that the idea of a direct contact 
between the rememberer and the past event is very intuitive. On the other hand, there 
is also another commonsensical train of thought that makes us conclude that the idea 
of a direct contact between the rememberer and the past event is not obvious. If there is 
contradiction (and, of course, there is), the contradiction is in the views held by propo-
nents of common sense in general. Is that a problem for common sense? Again, not in 
my opinion. We have to remember that common sense is not a doctrine. Common sense 
can be shamelessly “imethodical.”22 The point of common sense is to be a repository of 
practical—rather than theoretical—wisdom easily applicable to every life situation, and 
life is multifarious. In a certain way, common sense cultivates contradiction—you have 
to seize the moment, but you also have to be patient; you are never too old to learn, but 
you cannot teach an old dog new tricks—and mocks the scholar who points to the con-
tradiction but does not understand the practical usefulness, in a context, of an adage that 
contradicts a proverb.23 As seen through this lens, Michaelian and Sutton are not con-
tradicting themselves. Instead, they are pointing to two contradictory commonsensical 
views about the relationship between a rememberer and a past event. 
20  Michaelean and Sutton, “Memory.”
21  Ibid.
22  Clifford Geertz, “Common Sense as a Cultural System,” Antioch Review 33, no. 1 (1975): 5–26, http://
www.jstor.org/stable/4637616.
23  Ibid.
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Nevertheless, we are scholars, and for us the theoretical contradiction has to be explained. 
How can it be the case that it is both intuitive and not intuitive that a rememberer is in 
direct contact with a past event? I think that this paradox emerges from the conflict be-
tween four independently plausible judgments concerning the general question about 
the relationship between a rememberer and a past event:
Memory Realism (MR): What we remember is real.
Memory Access (MA): Memory gives us direct contact with the past.
Presentism (Pres): Only present events are real.
Representationalism (Repr): We can access directly only what is present. 
I believe that every one of these four claims is independently plausible. The evidence in 
favor of my belief is the easiness of the philosophical discourse offered as justification 
for these claims. In some cases, no theory is offered. In other cases, the proposed theory 
is indeed very intuitive. Memory Realism (MR) is held by anyone who accepts the pos-
sibility of truth (or some other kind of semantic accuracy) in memory—and it seems to 
be a truism that you cannot remember what did not happen.24 Also, it seems that “we 
are committed, in our ordinary manner of conceptualizing time, to the reality of the past 
and future.”25 Memory Access (MA) seems to be plain common sense. As Michaelian 
and Sutton said about direct realism and I have already quoted, “when one remembers, 
one is in the first instance related to past events themselves; it is thus perhaps the most 
intuitively appealing view of the nature of the objects of memory.” Presentism (Pres) 
seems very commonsensical. After all, the past is no more, and it seems that the future 
lacks being now. Usually, many philosophers just assume, without argument, that pre-
sentism is the commonsense view about the nature of time.26 That it is sufficient to estab-
lish our point in defense of the intuitiveness of (Pres). Representationalism (Repr) seems 
to be uncontroversial—as William Hamilton, the editor of the works of Thomas Reid, 
once wrote, a direct contact with a past event seems to be a contradiction.27
24  Bernecker, “Memory and Truth,” 52.
25  Adrian Bardon, A Brief History of the Philosophy of Time (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 86.
26  John W. Carroll and Ned Markosian, An Introduction to Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 181.
27  William Hamilton, quoted in Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man: Abridged, with 
Notes and Illustrations from Sir William Hamilton and Others, 7th ed., edited by James Walker (Boston: 
Phillips, Sampson, and Company, 1857), 211.
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All four claims—(MR), (MA), (Pres), and (Repr) —are independently intuitive and 
plausible. Nevertheless, the conjunction of all four claims seems to form a paradox. If 
what we remember is real (MR) and memory gives us direct access to the past (MA), 
then it is false that only present events are real and that we can access directly only what 
is present—~(Pres) and ~(Repr). If only present events are real (Pres) and we can access 
directly only what is present (Repr), then what we remember is real (MR) if it is present, 
but it is false that memory gives us direct access to the past—~(MA). Other combina-
tions are possible, but these two are enough to exemplify our problem. The first com-
bination—(MR), (MA), ~(Pres), and ~(Repr) —is similar to historical forms of direct 
realism about the intentional object of an episodic memory. The second combination—
(Pres), (Repr), (MR), and ~(MA)—is similar to historical forms of indirect or representa-
tive realism about the intentional object of an episodic memory. 
Now we have the elements required to deal with (PDCPE). It is both “obvious” and “not 
obvious” that a rememberer is in direct contact with a past event. On the one hand, it 
seems obvious that a rememberer is in direct contact with a past event because (MA) is 
intuitive: what one remembers, when one remembers episodically, it is past instead of 
present, future, or atemporal. Also, (MR) is intuitive: what one remembers is real. On the 
other hand, it does not seem obvious that a rememberer is in direct contact with a past 
event because (Pres) and (Repr) are intuitive: it seems commonsensical that only present 
events are real and that we can access only what is present. 
It is time to investigate (PIIE). Sant’Anna and Michaelian claim that an eternalist solution 
to the cotemporality problem is “expensive” because eternalism is intuitively implausi-
ble. They are right—eternalism seems odd. However, it does not follow from the oddness 
of eternalism that regular people do not believe in the reality of past and future events. 
As McTaggart claims in the opening of his classical paper “The Unreality of Time,” the 
reality of time—including past events—is denied by philosophers and mystics, but not 
by regular people:
It doubtless seems highly paradoxical to assert that Time is unreal, and that all 
statements which involve its reality are erroneous. Such an assertion involves a 
far greater departure from the natural position of mankind than is involved in 
the assertion of the unreality of Space or of the unreality of Matter. So decisive a 
breach with that natural position is not to be lightly accepted.28 
In this passage, McTaggart is pointing to the fact that regular people believe in the real-
ity of time —and time, intuitively, is more than the present. Commonsensical time has 
28  John Ellis McTaggart, “The Unreality of Time,” Mind 17, no. 68 (1908): 457.
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extension and duration—two temporal properties that require more than the present. Of 
course, McTaggart’s conclusion that time is unreal is too sophisticated to be immediately 
accepted by regular people. Nevertheless, McTaggart’s diagnostic is right. Regular people 
believe in the reality of time. 
Eternalism seems far from common sense. Nevertheless, regular people believe in (MA): 
memory gives us direct access to the past—which means that the Humean idea of an 
indirect access to the past is very sophisticated. Common sense is not sophisticated.29 
People not spoiled by philosophy believe in (MR): what is remembered is real—which 
means that the past is real. These—(MA) and (MR)—are two commonsensical views 
about memory that are consistent with eternalism. So why does eternalism seem odd? I 
submit that, in spite of the compatibility between the main tenets of eternalism and com-
mon sense, eternalism seems odd because it is a very complex theory, and proponents of 
common sense are proudly resistant to theories.30 Eternalism is and always will be awk-
ward to regular people, but the same is true for other complex theories with implications 
for the question about the nature of the intentional objects of memories. Presentism as a 
fully articulated theory, for instance, requires either the denial of (MR) and (MA) or very 
sophisticated explanations about our access to an unreal or present past. 
It could be objected, against my proposal, that not all theories are rejected by people 
espousing common sense for the simple reason that they are theories. Presentism, for 
instance, is a theory (Pres), and people accept it. I think that this objection goes in the 
right direction. Yes, people tend to accept simple theories as presentism, as far as they 
are presented as being constituted by a single commonsensical claim. To accept a simple 
theory is to accept a commonsensical claim, and regular people accept commonsensical 
claims. Nevertheless, regular people are more resistant to accept complex or articulated 
theories—even when they accept the grounds of a complex theory as a matter of com-
mon sense. That being the case, regular people can accept (Pres) easily, and reject the 
articulation of (Pres) with the denial of (MR) and (MA). This difference in behavior is 
explained by the fact that common sense is a repository of easy solutions to practical 
issues.31 Simple theories are easy and complex theories are hard, even when implied by 
commonsensical claims. 
Therefore, there is no substantive reason to reject eternalism as a solution to the cotempo-
rality problem on the grounds that eternalism is not “intuitive,” because any philosophi-
29  Geertz, “Common Sense.”
30  Ibid.
31  Ibid.
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cal theory is likely to be distasteful to regular people, notwithstanding the fact that many 
philosophical theses are compatible with some commonsensical judgements. common 
sense is not a doctrine—it is, as Clifford Geertz claims, “imethodical.” Common sense is 
not a religion—the point of common sense is life in this world, not salvation. Common 
sense is what remains as plain and simple guidance when religion, science, and philoso-
phy fail.32 When Michaelian and Sant’Anna reject Bernecker’s eternalist solution to the 
cotemporality problem because it is “unintuitive,” they are not presenting any substantive 
ground to reject this solution. Of course this solution is not obvious—no philosophical or 
theoretical solution would be obvious because “obviousness,” when talking about com-
mon sense, is a characteristic of a style of thinking (in contrast with an intentional object 
of a thought) featuring naturalness, practicalness, shallowness, “imethodicalness,” and 
“accessibleness.”33 It is just not possible to propose a minimally complex theory and be 
“obvious” in the sense required by common sense.   
5. The Objects of Episodic Memory
As discussed, there are two kinds of realism about the intentional object of a memory. 
On the one hand, there is representative realism, a position exemplified by the philoso-
phy of David Hume in his Inquiry from 1748: “The mind has never anything present to 
it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with 
objects. The supposition of such a connexion is, therefore, without any foundation in 
reasoning.”34 
According to Hume, any intentional mental state is about the representation of an ob-
ject, property, or state of affairs. No intentional mental state is directly about any object 
represented. Thus, Hume’s theory applies globally to perceptions, memories, and antici-
pations. On the other hand, there is direct realism. Nothing could be more distant from 
Hume’s position than Thomas Reid’s proposal in his Inquiry, from 1764:
Suppose that once, and only once, I smelled a tuberose in a certain room, where 
it grew in a pot, and gave a very grateful perfume. Next day I relate what I saw 
and smelled. When I attend as carefully as I can to what passes in my mind in 
this case, it appears evident that the very thing I saw yesterday, and the fragrance 
I smelled, are now the immediate objects of my mind, when I remember it. 
32  Ibid.
33  Ibid. 18.
34  David Hume, “An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,” section XII, part I (Adelaide, AU: 
eBooks@Adelaide), Accessed March 27, 2016, https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/h/hume/david/h92e/index.
html.
Schirmer dos Santos | Episodic Memory
 commons.pacificu.edu/eip eP1613 | 15
Further, I can imagine this pot and flower transported to the room where I now 
sit, and yielding the same perfume. Here likewise it appears, that the individual 
thing which I saw and smelled, is the object of my imagination.35 
Reid’s thought experiment is about the intentional object of S’s memory and imagina-
tion involving a particular property (the grateful smell of a very particular tuberose) 
experienced by S only once. Let’s call this particular property F. What does S recollect 
when she remembers F? What does S imagine when she is imagining F? Using common 
sense as a method, Reid concludes that S remembers and imagines F itself. What S has 
present to her, when she remembers or imagines a property, is the property itself, not a 
representation of a property. The same can be said about the recollection or imagination 
of an object or an event. The intentional object of a mental state, factive or not, is a real 
object, property, or state of affairs instead of their respective representations. 
Would it to be fair to say that the acceptance of Reid’s answer to his thought experiment 
about the smell of tuberose requires us to pay a very high metaphysical price? No, it would 
not. Reid claims that he is just following common sense, and it is true that people think they 
remember the events themselves which were experienced in the past—that is just (MA). It 
is not obvious or intuitive to people in general that we do not remember the situations that 
we lived in our personal pasts, notwithstanding the fact that (Repr) is intuitive. It is com-
monsensical that all we can access is present. Nevertheless, the theory that memory gives 
us no access to the past is very sophisticated. It is in conflict with (MA). Hume’s theory has 
some grounds in common sense, but it is far from being commonsensical. 
In sum, there is a classical divide between the two main kinds of realist philosophers on 
the subject of the intentional object of a memory. On the one hand, representative realist 
philosophers claim two things: (1) we remember representations of events instead of the 
events themselves and (2) the relation between an agent and the event remembered is in-
direct because it is mediated by a representation. On the other hand, direct realist philoso-
phers claim that we remember the events themselves with no mediation by any representa-
tion. Every party in this dispute can appeal to common sense as the ground for some of its 
claims, but no party in this dispute can win the debate by just appealing to common sense. 
6. A Question of Common Sense
As stated before, some critics of direct realism about episodic memory claim that this va-
riety of direct realism requires a metaphysics of time very far from common sense. Even 
granting the consistency with (MR) and (MA), two commonsensical claims, the meta-
35  Thomas Reid, “An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense,” in Inquiry and 
Essays, ed. Ronald E. Beanblossom and Keith Lehrer (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), 14.
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physics of time required by direct realism is eternalist, and eternalism seems “intuitively 
implausible.” I think that these critics of direct realism about episodic memory are right 
when they say that this variety of realism requires a very sophisticated metaphysics of time. 
Nevertheless, having in mind that (Pres) is in conflict with (MR) and (MA), presentism is 
not a better option. Are there any other alternatives? Not in the spectrum of the classical 
discussion about direct and indirect realism. Outside the scope of this debate, Sant’Anna 
and Michaelian propose a pragmatist theory about the intentional object of episodic 
thought in general, including the intentional object of an episodic memory. They claim 
that the intentional object of an episodic memory is a “pragmatic object.”36 The discussion 
of this proposal is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, on the question about the 
intuitiveness of their theory, the authors themselves acknowledge the “unorthodox” and 
“unconventional” character of their proposal. Clearly, they are talking about the fact that 
pragmatism is not a mainstream theory. However, they do not claim that their proposal is 
commonsensical. Pragmatic objects are “immediately available to the mind, regardless of 
whether they exist.”37 As far as I can see, it means that Sant’Anna and Michaelian’s pragma-
tism is not committed to (MR), (MA), (Pres), or (Repr). It is not committed to (MR), since 
the pragmatic object can exist, or not. It is not committed to (MA), since it does not claim 
that episodic memory gives us direct access to the past. It is not committed to (Pres), since 
it does not claim that only present events exist. Finally, it is not committed to (Repr), since 
it does not claim that we can access directly only what is present. All these features of a 
pragmatic object are evidence that it cannot be discussed in the framework of the classical 
debate about the nature of the intentional object of an episodic memory. For this reason, 
it is not possible in this paper to parse carefully the details of Sant’Anna and Michaelian’s 
proposal. I will leave the notion of a pragmatic object as a question to be investigated on 
another occasion. All I can suggest for now is that it does not seem a more commonsensi-
cal proposal than presentism or eternalism. 
To get back to the main point, on the relation between commonsensical intuitions and 
philosophical theories in the classical framework for the discussion of the question about 
the intentional object of an episodic memory, I believe that neither of the two main theo-
ries of time is in a better situation than the other. The problem is not that some presentist 
or eternalist intuitions can be grounded in common sense. The problem is that, notwith-
standing the fact that the most diverse philosophical claims about the nature of time can 
be supported by commonsensical intuitions, no articulated theory of time can be con-
sistently attributed to people in general. As regards the metaphysics of time, there is no 
coherent theory that can be attributed, without qualifications, to people not intoxicated 
36  Sant’Anna and Michaelian, “Thinking about Events.”
37  Ibid.
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by philosophy. People naturally accept (Pres): present events—in contrast with past and 
future events—exist. However, people also accept without reflection that they remember 
the events themselves which were experienced in the past. It would be wrong to say that 
presentism has no ground in common sense, but it would also be wrong to say that eter-
nalism has no ground in common sense. People do think they have, through memory, 
direct access to the past, and people easily accept (MR): what we remember is real, in 
contrast with what we just imagine, and these are commonsensical grounds for eternal-
ist theses. In sum, there are a lot of folk theses about the nature of time, but there is no 
coherent folk theory about the nature of time. Therefore, it is always possible to criticize 
a theory of memory grounded in a theory of time because it mismatches common sense. 
But this kind of criticism is not fair because it is always possible to ground a theory of 
memory in some—presentist or eternalist— “theses” from folk philosophy of time. 
In short, I am not saying that we can disregard common sense when we do metaphys-
ics of memory or metaphysics of time. Any metaphysics that despises folk intuitions or 
theories is hopeless. Folk metaphysics is always relevant. All I am saying is that in some 
cases, isolated intuitions from folk metaphysics are not sufficient to rule out a theory. 
That occurs when folk intuitions about the nature of reality are in mutual conflict, and 
that is the case when we are talking about folk metaphysics of time. 
7. Direct Realism about Memory with Eternalism
According to direct realism, we remember the past itself, without intermediaries, because 
we have had direct contact with the past itself. Therefore, we do not have to infer from the 
present representation that E happened in the past the fact that E happened in the past. The 
problem is: how is it possible to have a direct contact, in the present, with a past event? That 
is the cotemporality problem.38 In this section, I will attempt to clarify (at least a little) the 
notion of direct contact required by direct realism by the metaphysical explanation of the 
notions of immediate knowledge and coexistence. I argue that direct contact in the sense of 
immediate knowledge or coexistence seems to be a problem for an eternalist direct realist 
about episodic memory only if presentism is presupposed—which begs the question. 
Reid says that when we remember, we have direct contact with a past event. As I men-
tioned before, his editor William Hamilton disagrees: “An immediate knowledge of a 
past thing is a contradiction. For we can only know a thing immediately, if we know it in 
itself, or as existing; but what is past cannot be known in itself, for it is non-existent. In 
this respect memory differs from perception.”39 
38  Bernecker, Metaphysics of Memory, 68–69
39  Hamilton quoted in Reid, “An Inquiry,” 211.
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Hamilton’s point is about the mode of being of events. He is claiming that only what 
exists now can be known immediately. But a past event does not exist now. Therefore, a 
past event cannot be known immediately. Hamilton’s point is not (Repr) —it is not about 
present representations as metaphysical bridges between agents and past events. He is 
not claiming that you can only access things through representations. Hamilton’s point is 
not Hume’s point. Hamilton’s point is about metaphysics of time instead of metaphysics 
of intentionality. He is saying that there is a metaphysical problem for direct realism even 
if we grant that Reid’s direct realism is right and Hume’s representative realism is wrong. 
The problem is that to exist, for an event, is to be now, and past events are no more. 
Also, Hamilton’s point is not Sant’Anna and Michaelian’s point. Hamilton worries about 
logic—contradiction—instead of common sense. For Hamilton, to know immediately a 
past event “is a contradiction.” The contradiction is that a past event is nonexistent now, 
but what is immediately known is existent now. 
The solution, again, is eternalism. If eternalist philosophers are right, then a past event 
does not occur now, but it does exist now. For an event, to occur before or after another 
event is one thing, but to exist tout court is another thing. That is why it is possible to 
have direct contact with a past event. 
How could a rememberer have direct contact with a past event? The solution proposed by 
Bernecker is eternalism about the nature of time. According to eternalism, past events do 
not cease to be after they occur. It then follows that a direct contact with a past event is at 
least possible. How does it happen? By metaphysical constitution. The past event E con-
stitutes the memory of E in the sense that a phenomenologically qualitative replica of S’s 
remembering of E would not be a memory of E if it had not been constituted by event E.40 
Another kind of objection to direct realism about episodic memory concerns coexistence: 
A third implication, I believe, of ‘direct awareness,’ in its philosophical use, is 
that if B is ‘directly’ aware of X, then B and X coexist. . . . This implication makes 
hard sledding for any interpretation of memory as direct awareness. Although 
a person can be said to remember someone who is standing right before him, 
it is also true that we speak of remembering last week’s bonfire or earth tremor. 
The bonfire is not now burning nor the earth now trembling.41  
40  Dorothea Debus, “Experiencing the Past: A Relational Account of Recollective Memory,” Dialectica 
62, no. 4: 405–32, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2008.01165.x; Campbell, Reference and 
Consciousness.
41  Norman Malcolm, “Memory as Direct Awareness of the Past,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 9 
(March 1975): 1–22, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0080443600000960.
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In my interpretation, “coexistence” in this passage means “simultaneity,” and the problem is 
that last week’s bonfire and the present recalling of last week’s bonfire are not simultaneous. 
Of course, Hume’s representative realism solves the problem: the present representation of 
last week’s bonfire and the present recalling of last week’s bonfire are simultaneous. There-
fore, they can “coexist” according to Malcolm’s meaning of “coexistence.” Nevertheless, the 
representative realist has to concede that the memory of last week’s bonfire is about last 
week’s bonfire, not about the present representation of last week’s bonfire, which means 
that the representation as a vehicle can be present, but the event is represented as past. The 
representative realist can retort that last week’s bonfire is represented as past now, which 
means that the intentional object of the representation is the present instead of the past. 
The realist can insist that the fact that last week’s bonfire is grasped in the present is beyond 
doubt—but it does not mean that last week’s bonfire exists in the present.42 That’s the main 
problem concerning “coexistence” for representative realism. The representative realist 
philosopher would have to pay a high price to explain the memory of last week’s bonfire 
making reference only to present objects, properties, and states of affairs. (MR) would have 
to be sacrificed, and (MA) would have to be remodeled as a theoretical construct. The di-
rect realist also pays a high price—the distinction between the occurrence and the existence 
of an event. Hence, the question about the intentional object of an episodic memory is not 
“cheap” for any theory. Consequently, the direct realist can use the eternalist solution to 
clear up the cotemporality problem paying the same kind of “price” that indirect realism 
would also have to pay to solve que question about “coexistence.”
The upshot of this section is that eternalism explains how direct contact with the past can 
be possible. Bearing in mind that the upshot of the previous section was that common 
sense is compatible with presentism and eternalism, we have sufficient elements to claim 
that there is no “common sense” problem that affects exclusively the eternalist solution 
to the cotemporality problem for direct realism about episodic memory. This is because 
(1) it is intuitive that memories are about past events and (2) the fact that a past event 
does not occur now does not prevent the present existence of a past event. 
Conclusions
The cotemporality problem is about the consequences of direct realism about episodic 
memory. It is intuitive (MR): that we remember the past events themselves instead of the 
present representations of the past events; (Repr): that what we access is present; (MA): 
that memory gives us access to the past—but the idea that a rememberer is in direct con-
42  Laird, “Recollection,” 412.
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tact, in the present, with a past event can seem odd.43 
Does a past event exist? That is a question about the metaphysics of time. Unfortunately, 
folk metaphysics would lead us astray on this particular question. On the one hand, 
people do believe that an event that ceased to occur exists no more (Pres). On the other 
hand, people do believe that we remember past events instead of their present repre-
sentations (MR). To believe this, you have to presuppose that there are past events to be 
remembered. 
Folk metaphysics of time cannot help us. We have to appeal to philosophical theories of 
time. Presentism is not a good option for direct realists about episodic memory for two 
reasons. First, presentism raises the cotemporality problem for direct realism. Second, 
presentism has no simple explanation for the fact that a memory about a past event can 
be assessed as accurate or inaccurate. These two reasons give the direct realist a negative 
rationale to subscribe to eternalism about the nature of time. However, there are also 
positive reasons for a direct realist about episodic memory to be an eternalist. First, eter-
nalism explains how a past event can be available for representation. Second, eternalism 
explains how a past event can make an episodic memory accurate. Given these grounds, 
eternalism is the best choice for a direct realist about episodic memory. 
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